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Recent research suggests that response inhibition training can alter impulsive and compulsive behavior.
When stop signals are introduced in a gambling task, people not only become more cautious when
executing their choice responses, they also prefer lower bets when gambling. Here, we examined how
stopping motor responses influences gambling. Experiment 1 showed that the reduced betting in
stop-signal blocks was not caused by changes in information sampling styles or changes in arousal. In
Experiments 2a and 2b, people preferred lower bets when they occasionally had to stop their response
in a secondary decision-making task but not when they were instructed to respond as accurately as
possible. Experiment 3 showed that merely introducing trials on which subjects could not gamble did not
influence gambling preferences. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the effect of stopping on gambling
generalized to different populations. Further, 2 combined analyses suggested that the effect of stopping
on gambling preferences was reliable but small. Finally, Experiment 5 showed that the effect of stopping
on gambling generalized to a different task. On the basis of our findings and earlier research, we propose
that the presence of stop signals influences gambling by reducing approach behavior and altering the
motivational value of the gambling outcome.
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Many theorists assume that decision making involves an inter-
play between automatic and control processes (e.g., Kahneman,
2003; Norman & Shallice, 1986). Automatic processes are con-
sidered to be fast, associative, effortless, and easily triggered by
information in the environment. In contrast, top-down executive
control processes are considered to be slower, more effortful, and
goal dependent. Executive processes involve organizing, monitor-
ing, biasing, and altering the settings of lower level cognitive
processes such as stimulus detection, response selection, and mo-
tor programming (e.g., Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers,
2014). This allows us to ignore distracting information in the
environment, overcome habits or suppress actions, and adjust
decision-making strategies when outcomes are suboptimal (Logan
& Gordon, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Monsell & Driver, 2000;
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Norman & Shallice, 1986). When the executive control system is
otherwise engaged or impaired, automatic processes are thought to
guide behavior. For example, patients with lesions to the frontal
cortex, which is critical for executive control processes, often
become impulsive, take more risks, struggle to overcome tempta-
tions, fail to correct errors, and show habitual behavior when it is
contextually inappropriate (Duncan, 1986; Milner, 1963; Perret,
1974; Shallice, 1982). Brain stimulation of these brain areas in-
duces similar behaviors in healthy subjects (e.g., Chambers et al.,
2006; Knoch et al., 2006; Rushworth, Hadland, Paus, & Sipila,
2002; Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010).
In a recent study, we used a concurrent load technique to
examine how manipulations of executive control influence mon-
etary decisions when gambling (Verbruggen, Adams, & Cham-
bers, 2012). The concurrent load technique is often used to mea-
sure the relative contributions of automatic and executive control
processes in a task (e.g., Logan, 1979; Kahneman, 2003). The
central assumption is that tasks that require control processes tend
to compete with each other and that this results in a performance
decrement. In contrast, automatic processes are assumed to occur
in parallel, so concurrent load influences them less. We used a load
manipulation in a novel gambling task that measured decision
making under uncertainty. On every trial, subjects were presented
with six choice options, which were represented by six adjacent
bars (see Figure 1). Each option (or bar) was associated with a
certain amount subjects could win; however, they were informed
that the higher the amount, the less probable a win. Thus, selecting
higher amounts represented “risky bets,” whereas selecting lower
amounts represented “safe bets.”1 After 3.5 s, the bars started
rising, and subjects had to respond when the bars reached a top line
(see Figure 1). Healthy young adults performed this task through-
out the session. In some blocks (load blocks), subjects also had to
perform a secondary task. The nature of this task depended on the
group to which the subjects were assigned. In the first group
(double-response group), the secondary task required subjects to
execute an additional response when the top of the bars turned
black (the double-response signal). In the second group (stop
group), subjects had to stop the planned choice response when the
top of the bars turned black (the stop signal). The signals occurred
on one-third of the trials of the load blocks. Monitoring for
occasional signals, keeping extra task rules in working memory,
and preparing to change action plans (i.e., adding an extra response
or withholding the planned response) increases cognitive load
(e.g., Vandierendonck, De Vooght, & Van der Goten, 1998; Ver-
bruggen & Logan, 2009). We predicted that decision making
would become less regulated in load blocks because of the in-
creased demand for executive control under these conditions (Lo-
gan, 1979; Kahneman, 2003; Pashler, 1998). Indeed, we found that
subjects in the double-response group tended to place higher bets
with a lower probability of winning in load blocks in which
double-response signals could occur than in no-load blocks (in
which no signals could occur), although this effect failed to reach
significance. In contrast, subjects in the stop group placed lower
bets with a higher probability of winning in load blocks in which
stop signals could occur than in no-load blocks (in which no
signals could occur). This effect was statistically significant, as
was the Block Type  Group interaction. Thus, different types of
cognitive load influenced decision making differently. Follow-up
tests indicated that the load effect was not a result of differences in
probability learning, block order, or estimation of expected value.
We attributed the effect of a stop load to “a transfer of cautious-
ness” brought about by having to withhold a response in this
condition. Several studies have demonstrated that dealing with
stop signals makes people more cautious in executing motor re-
sponses (Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010;
Liddle et al., 2009; Lo, Boucher, Paré, Schall, & Wang, 2009;
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers,
Kahn, & Vink, 2013). In Verbruggen et al. (2012), people also
became more cautious when executing their choice responses (as
indexed by longer choice latencies), and we hypothesized that this
stopping-induced motor cautiousness transferred to monetary
choice in our gambling task (counteracting the effect of multitask
interference observed in the double-response group). This transfer
effect could have important practical implications for the treatment
of disorders that have been linked to poor executive control, such
as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, obsessive–compulsive
disorder, substance abuse, eating disorders, and pathological gam-
bling (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; De Wit, 2009;
Noël, Brevers, & Bechara, 2013; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit,
& Ersche, 2012; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). In a recent article,
Holmes, Craske, and Graybiel (2014) made a strong case for
bridging the gap between basic laboratory research and clinical
science and, more generally, for an integrative mental health
science. They argued that evidence-based psychological treatments
could benefit greatly from studying the mechanisms behind psy-
chological treatments and from examining the processes that can
relieve dysfunctional behavior. In the present study, we therefore
probed the specific cognitive processes that regulate choice and
high-level decision making. Ultimately, this could potentially open
up new avenues for the treatment of pathological gambling.
Because one could argue that attributing the stop effect to some sort
of cautiousness transfer is merely a redescription of the behavioral
findings (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014), we report a series of
experiments that examined how the introduction of stop signals in-
fluenced gambling. Experiment 1 tested whether stopping influenced
decision making directly, by changing information-sampling styles, or
indirectly, by changing arousal levels. Experiments 2a and 2b further
explored the cautiousness transfer hypothesis by manipulating cau-
tiousness in an unrelated secondary task. Experiment 3 examined
whether the effect of stopping was a result of the requirement not to
gamble on a proportion of the trials. In Experiments 4 and 5, we
explored the generality of our findings. In Experiment 4, we asked
whether the transfer effect was also observed in gamblers (with and
without gambling problems); in addition, we performed two analyses
that combined the data of all experiments using the bar task. Finally,
in Experiment 5, we used a different gambling paradigm in which the
exact probabilities of winning and losing were shown on each trial.
1 In this task, risk-taking behavior refers to preferring relatively high
amounts with a low probability of winning (and, therefore, a low expected
value) over low amounts with a high probability of winning. This is
commonly seen as risk-taking behavior (and it is the behavior that patho-
logical gamblers engage in). However, this is different from what some
researchers have defined as risk taking—namely preferring an uncertain
prospect (e.g., a 50% chance of winning £100 and a 50% chance of
winning £50) over a certain prospect (100% chance of winning £75) with
the same expected value.
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Experiment 1: Is the Effect of Stopping on Monetary
Decisions Driven by a Change in Processing Style or
Arousal Levels?
In Experiment 1, we examined whether stop signals induced a
more elaborate processing of stimuli and choice options in the
gambling task. Previous work suggests that changes in processing
styles occur when subjects expect a stop signal in a standard
stop-signal task (Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmak-
ers, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). This results in longer
reaction times (RTs) but fewer choice errors. This has been attrib-
uted to an increase in response thresholds; consequently, more
information has to be sampled before a decision is made (e.g.,
Ratcliff, 2006; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). One possible mechanism
by which the introduction of stop signals could have an effect on
decision making in the gambling task is that the stop-signal ma-
nipulation causes subjects to process the various options more
elaborately (i.e., more time focusing on the betting alternatives or
actively considering more alternatives on each betting trial). In our
task, we could not rely on RTs to estimate when a decision is
made. The initial 3,500-ms phase in which the bars did not rise
allowed for the possibility of subjects selecting an amount well
before their choice response was executed. Therefore, we recorded
eye movements as a measure of the temporal dynamics of decision
making. We assumed that making a decision would correlate
positively with dwell time, which is a measurement of how long
people look at a specific region or amount on the screen. Changes
in the overall dwell time without changes in its distribution over
the options would suggest quantitative changes in processing style
(as previously observed in, e.g., Verbruggen & Logan, 2009).
The introduction of stop signals could also change the sampling
strategy in a more categorical or qualitative way. Recent work from
our lab suggests that presenting stop signals alters processing of visual
information in the primary go task (Verbruggen, Stevens, & Cham-
bers, 2014). More specifically, we have demonstrated that in certain
stop-signal tasks, proactive control also involves adjusting visuospa-
tial attention parameters. The stimulus display of our gambling task
required subjects to process visual information at various locations if
they wanted to process all amounts to make a decision. Each bar
Figure 1. Examples of the two trial types in the bar task. The top panel shows the sequence of events on trials
without signals. The bottom panel shows the sequence of events on a signal trial. The trial started with six
potential bets. Underneath the betting options, letters were displayed that referred to the response keys on the
keyboard. After 3,500 ms, the bars started rising until they reached the top white line after either 1.333 s or
1.667 s. On no-signal trials, subjects were required to choose one of the bets by pressing the corresponding letter
when the bars reached the top white line. The response was recorded as correct when it was made between
250 ms before reaching the line and 250 ms after reaching the line. If the subjects won, they would get the points
they bet; if they lost, they would lose half of the betted points. On signal trials, the bars turned black before
reaching the line. If subjects saw the signal, then depending on the group they were in, they either made a
double-response or attempted to withhold their response. On signal trials, subjects received or lost a fixed
amount, depending on whether they responded correctly to the signal or correctly withheld their response. At the
end of the trial, feedback was presented that showed the subjects how much they had won or lost and their current
balance. On signal trials, subjects were told whether they responded correctly or correctly withheld their
response, how much they gained or lost, and their current balance. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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turned black on stop-signal trials, so our stopping manipulation could
have encouraged subjects to focus on each bar, and its associated
amount, more systematically. In a risk-averse population,2 such a
change could lead to a reduction in the amount people bet. Thus,
systematic changes in sampling patterns (indexed by the distribution
of average dwell time over locations or amounts and by the overall
number of fixations) that correlate with changes in behavior would
suggest such qualitative changes in sampling strategies.
Our first two accounts can be described as “cognitive” accounts
that assume that stopping motor responses alters decision making
by directly altering cognitive parameters. They are based on the
idea that the executive control system regulates behavior by bias-
ing or modulating the parameters of basic cognitive processes,
such as stimulus processing and response selection (see the fore-
going discussion). However, research on decision making under
uncertainty, and gambling in particular, suggests that cognitive
decision making and emotional processes may interact (Pessoa,
2013; but for a critical review of this area, see Dunn, Dalgleish, &
Lawrence, 2006). Therefore, we also explored a third hypothesis in
Experiment 1. Some studies have shown that stopping can change
arousal levels (Casada & Roache, 2006; Jennings, van der Molen,
Brock, & Somsen, 1992; van Boxtel, van der Molen, Jennings, &
Brunia, 2001). By altering arousal levels, stopping may influence
monetary decision making in our paradigm, much as Rockloff,
Signal, and Dyer (2007; see also Rockloff & Greer, 2010) have
shown that manipulating arousal can alter choice behavior in
gambling tasks. We tested this “arousal” account by measuring
skin conductance response (SCR), which provides a measure of
autonomic arousal. If stopping influences gambling by altering
arousal levels, SCR differences between load and no-load blocks
should correlate with changes in betting strategies.
Method
Subjects. Sixty-four volunteers (45 female, mean age  21
years) from the University of Exeter (Exeter, United Kingdom)
community participated for monetary compensation (£6 [approx-
imately U.S.$9]), which was unrelated to performance. All exper-
iments of the present study were conducted in accordance with the
regulations laid out by the Exeter School of Psychology ethics
committee, and written informed consent was obtained after the
nature and possible consequences of the studies were explained.
The target sample was decided in advance of data collection.
Apparatus, stimuli, and behavioral procedure. The proce-
dure was closely modeled on that of Verbruggen et al. (2013).
Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. cathode ray tube monitor
against a dark gray background (RGB: 100, 100, 100). The dis-
tance between the subjects’ eyes and the center of the screen was
58 cm. The task was run using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997;
Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002). On each trial, six yellow
(RGB: 255, 255, 0) vertical bars were presented next to each other
(see Figure 1). Each bar was associated with a certain amount
(presented in yellow) and a specific response key (presented in
white: the d, f, g, h, j, or k key of a QWERTY keyboard). Subjects
were instructed to select one of the amounts by pressing the
corresponding key (e.g., in Figure 1, if they wanted to select 112,
they had to press h). They were informed that the probability of
winning decreased as the amount increased, without the exact
probabilities being revealed. The amounts and response keys were
presented below the bars. The order of the amounts varied from
trial to trial to prevent spatial orienting toward one of the bars
before the options were presented or response-bias effects (e.g.,
selecting higher amounts could reflect a rightward response bias if
these were consistently presented on the right of the screen).
Each trial in no-load blocks started with the presentation of the
start bars, amounts, and the associated keys (see Figure 1). The
bars appeared between two white horizontal lines. After 3,500
ms, the bars started rising together. All bars reached the top line
after 1,333 ms on low-bar trials and after 1,667 ms on high-bar
trials (the distance between bottom and top line was approxi-
mately 9 cm on low-bar trials and 11 cm on high-bar trials). The
original study manipulated bar height to test for effects of
choice latency (see Verbruggen et al., 2012, supplementary
material). Trials ended 500 ms after the bars reached the top
line. Subjects had to execute the choice response before the end
of the trial but not sooner than 250 ms before the bars reached
the top line. The moving bars and response windows ensured
that signals (see the following discussion) could be presented at
an optimal moment. Feedback was presented at the end of each
trial and indicated how much subjects had won or lost and what
the current balance was. The feedback screen was then replaced
by a blank screen after 2,500 ms, and the following trial started
after a further 500 ms.
In load blocks, subjects had to select one of six amounts and
indicate their choice when the yellow bars reached the top line on
two-thirds of the trials, just as in the no-load blocks. On the
remaining one-third of trials, the top of the rising bars turned black
(signal) just before reaching the top line (see Figure 1). On signal
trials, the subjects from the double-response group pressed the
space bar of the keyboard with either thumb after they had indi-
cated their choice (i.e., after they pressed the d, f, g, h, j, or k key
of the keyboard). They had to press the space bar within 500 ms
after the bars reached the top line. The subjects from the stop group
had to refrain from making any response when the signal was
presented. In both groups, signal onset was dynamically adjusted
for each individual. Initially, the bars turned black 266 ms before
they reached the top line. When subjects successfully stopped their
response or pressed the alternate key in time (i.e., within 500 ms
after the bars reached the top line), this delay was decreased by 33
ms, making it harder to successfully stop or execute the double-
response on the next trial. When subjects failed to stop or execute
the double-response in time, the delay was increased by 33 ms,
making it easier to successfully stop or execute the double-
response on the next trial.
On each trial in both block types, subjects could win or lose
points. As noted earlier, subjects were informed at the beginning of
the experiment that the probability of winning—p(win)—was
lower for higher amounts, but we did not reveal the exact proba-
bilities. The exact amount depended on the stake (low, medium, or
high). The amounts [with p(win)s] subjects could win in the
low-stake condition were as follows: 64 [p(win)  .20], 32
[p(win)  .25], 16 [p(win)  .325], 8 [p(win)  .47], 4 [p(win) 
.605], and 2 [p(win)  .872]. In losses, subjects lost half the
chosen amount. Amounts decreased exponentially to make the
2 Most individuals tend to be risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), so
we assume that the subjects in our experiment were also generally risk averse.
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higher amounts more attractive. The expected values (EVs)—
[EV  (p(win)  amount)  ((1  p(win))  amount/2)]—of the
first three bets were positive and approximately the same. The two
most “risky” options (Choice Options 5 and 6) had a negative
expected value; we included these because superficially attractive
options, associated with relatively high amounts but with a nega-
tive expected value, are common in gambling situations (for in-
stance in the lottery, on racing odds, or slot machines). For
medium stakes, all amounts were  2; for high stakes, amounts
were  4. We manipulated stakes to increase selection demands,
to encourage processing of the different amounts on each trial,
and to encourage subjects to consider the relative risk versus
benefit of each amount (Verbruggen et al., 2012). The three
stakes occurred in random order with equal probability and had
to be inferred by the subjects from the amounts that were
presented below the bars. Because we could not infer which
response subjects were planning to execute on successful stop-
signal trials, the number of points won or lost on signal trials
was fixed. Subjects won 10 points on successful signal trials
and lost 10 points on unsuccessful signal trials in both the stop
and double-response groups. Thus, on double-response re-
sponse trials, subjects always won or lost 10 points, regardless
of their choice response. Similarly, on unsuccessful stop trials,
subjects always lost 10 points, regardless of the amount they
indicated with their inappropriately executed choice response.
On incorrect no-signal trials (i.e., trials on which no response
was recorded, more than one response was recorded, or a key
that was not part of the response set was pressed during the
response window), subjects also lost 10 points.
The starting balance was 2,500 points. The experiment started
with a short practice phase that consisted of a no-load block and a
load block. The balance of points won or lost was reset after this
practice phase. The experimental phase consisted of four no-load
blocks and four load blocks of 36 trials each. Half of the subjects
started with a load block, and the other half started with a no-load
block. There was a short break after each block; block types
alternated predictably, and their order was counterbalanced over
subjects. Subjects were instructed to win as many points as pos-
sible. Unlike in our previous study, points were not converted to
money at the end of the experiment. The aim in this experiment
was to maximize the total number of points, and it is clear that the
subjects tried to do so. Playing only for points is common in the
literature (e.g., Knoch et al., 2006), which has shown it to be an
effective incentive that helps to minimize the financial cost of the
research. However, it is possible that removing the monetary
incentive reduced the effect size (see the General Discussion).
Eye-tracking procedure. An EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount
camera system (SR Research, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada), cali-
brated before each block, tracked the gaze position of either the
right or left eye during the whole block at a sampling rate of 500
Hz; each subject rested their chin in a chinrest for the duration
of the testing. For most subjects, we tracked the right eye, but
for 10 subjects we tracked the left eye because of difficulties in
adequately capturing the right pupil or achieving satisfactory
calibration.
SCR procedure. SCR was recorded using a Powerlab 26t setup
with Biopac EL509 electrodes and LabChart 7 software (ADInstruments,
Oxford, United Kingdom). Two electrodes were attached to the
bottom side of the left wrist at the start of the experiment,
before giving instructions and initializing the eye tracker con-
figuration. This allowed ample time for the SCR signal to return
to baseline.
Analyses
Behavioral data. The primary dependent variable in the bar
task is the betting score. The six available bets on each trial are
ranked 1– 6, with 1 being the lowest value. Higher betting
scores indicated that subjects preferred higher amounts with a
lower probability of winning. Averages were calculated for
correct no-signal trials only: We excluded no-signal trials on
which no response was recorded, more than one response was
recorded, or a key that was not part of the response set was
pressed during the response window. We excluded trials that
followed an incorrect no-signal trial (see also Verbruggen et al.,
2012), as they were infrequent and previous research suggests
that such infrequent events could orient attention away from the
main task (Notebaert et al., 2009).
In the original study, we tested whether the load effect
increased or decreased during the experimental session (Ver-
bruggen et al., 2012, supplementary analysis). Even though
subjects were told that wins were less probable for higher
amounts, the exact probabilities or expected values were not
revealed. Our task therefore contained an element of learning.
Further, proactive control often increases throughout the exper-
iment (Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013), which could
modulate the load effect. To examine how the load effects
evolved over time, we subdivided the session into four parts:
Blocks 1 and 2 (first load- and no-load block, to be known as
Part 1), Blocks 3 and 4 (second load- and no-load block, Part
2), Blocks 5 and 6 (third load- and no-load block, Part 3), and
Blocks 7 and 8 (fourth load- and no-load block, Part 4).
We analyzed choice data using load (no-load vs. load blocks),
stake (low, medium, high), and part (1–4) as within-subject vari-
ables and group (stop, double-response) as a between-subjects
variable. We ran separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the
Group  Load  Stake interaction and the Group  Load  Part
interaction because there were insufficient trials for a full factorial
analysis.
In all experiments, we also calculated Bayes factors to explore
the theoretically relevant effect of stopping. In Experiment 1, we
calculated Bayes factors for the crucial Load  Group interaction.
We also calculated Bayes factors for the simple main effect of
stopping (Experiments 1, 2b, and 4) or the speed–accuracy and
no-rise manipulations (Experiments 2a and 3). Both the interaction
and the simple main effects can be tested using simple t tests (the
first as a t test of difference scores, the second as a t test of
performance in the no-load and load blocks). Several methods now
exist to calculate the Bayesian equivalent of a t test. A Bayes factor
compares two hypotheses; in this study, these are the hypothesis
that introducing a stop load decreases betting scores (the experi-
mental hypothesis) and the hypothesis that introducing a load does
not influence betting (the null hypothesis). Bayes factors vary
between 0 and infinity, with values of less than 0.33 indicating
substantial support for the null hypothesis and values greater than
3 indicating substantial support for the alternative. Following
Dienes (2011), in Experiment 1 of this study, we used a normal
distribution with a mean of .15, which corresponds to the numer-
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ical difference in betting scores for the stop group in Experiment
1 of Verbruggen et al. (2012) and a standard deviation that is half
of the mean. After Experiment 1, we adjusted the mean (.125)—
and, consequently, the standard deviation (.0625)—by taking the
average of the effect sizes observed in Verbruggen et al. (2012)
and Experiment 1 of the present study. This acknowledges the fact
that more information became available after the direct replication
(i.e., Experiment 1 of this study). We calculated the Bayes factors
using the R-version of Zoltan Dienes’ Bayes calculator (http://
www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/bayes_
factor.swf). All data files and R scripts used for the analyses are
deposited on the Open Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl
.handle.net/10871/15733).
Eye-movement data. We selected six regions around the bets
for analysis (see Figure 2 for their location and size). The eye-
tracking data of two subjects were excluded because the tracker
failed to properly track their pupil.
A first analysis focused on dwell time for each spatial location
(from left to right, irrespective of amount). To assess whether
scanning patterns changed in load blocks compared with no-load
blocks, we measured the total duration of all the fixations on the
six spatial regions in the decision-making phase (i.e., the 3,500-ms
window between the presentation of the betting options and the
onset of the bars rising). If subjects looked only at one region (e.g.,
if they fixated only the leftmost region) during the whole decision-
making interval, the dwell time for this region would be 3,500 ms,
and it would be 0 ms for all other regions. If they fixated other
parts of the stimulus (e.g., the bars before they started rising), the
sum of the dwell times would be less than 3,500 ms. The behav-
ioral analyses (presented later) showed that the Group  Load
interaction was not influenced by stake or part. Therefore, we
collapsed across part and stake to increase the number of obser-
vations for each of the six regions. We compared dwell time for the
six regions between groups and load conditions by running a
three-way mixed ANOVA with spatial location, group (stop vs.
double-response), and load (no-load vs. load block) as factors.
In a second analysis, we focused on dwell time for each amount
(from low to high, irrespective of location). If subjects looked only
at one amount (e.g., if they fixated only the number 8) during the
whole decision-making interval, the dwell time for this amount
would be 3,500 ms, and it would be 0 ms for all other amounts. We
compared dwell time for the six amounts between groups and load
conditions by running a three-way mixed ANOVA with amount,
group (stop vs. double-response), and load (no-load vs. load block)
as factors. We again collapsed over stake and part to increase the
number of observations.
Finally, we also report the average number of fixations on each
a trial. The number of fixations was analyzed with a two-way
mixed ANOVA with group (stop vs. double-response) and load
(no-load vs. load block) as factors.
SCR data. To analyze possible effects on arousal, we com-
pared SCR levels of load blocks with no-load blocks for both
groups. SCR levels for each block were determined by averaging
them over the 3,500-ms decision-making phase. By choosing this
interval, we minimized the influence of movement artifacts that
occur when a response is made. This analysis was done on correct
no-signal trials (described earlier). To allow a direct comparison
with the analysis of the eye-movement data, we focus on the
Group  Load interaction only.3
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. Approximately 49% of the signal trials
across groups were correct, which confirmed the effectiveness of
the tracking procedure (the target was 50%). There was a small but
reliable difference (p  .035) in success rates on signal trials
between the groups (failed double-responses  48%, failed
stops  50%).
To test whether proactive inhibition induced motor cautious-
ness, we compared choice latencies in no-load and load blocks for
both groups. RTs were calculated relative to the moment the bars
reached the top line; consequently, negative values indicate that
subjects responded before the bars reached the line. Subjects in the
stop group were 73 ms slower in load blocks (63 ms) than in
no-load blocks (10 ms). This slowing was less pronounced in the
double-response group (load blocks: 8 ms; no-load blocks: 35
ms; mean difference  43 ms). This indicates that our stopping
load induced motor cautiousness. There was a reliable effect of
load (p  .001; see Table 1) and of group (p  .001) and a reliable
Group  Load interaction (p  .001).
Betting data. A complete overview of the descriptive statis-
tics and ANOVAs is given in Tables 2 and 3. Here, we focus on
the theoretically relevant analyses. Subjects in the stop group
selected lower bets with a higher probability of winning in load
blocks (bet score  3.13) than in no-load blocks (3.21). In con-
3 In the SCR analysis, there were more observations per cell than in the
eye-movement analysis, in which we had to include region or amount.
Therefore, in the initial SCR analysis, we also performed a Group 
Load  Part analysis. This three-way interaction was not significant (p 
.79). The main effect of part and the two-way Part  Group and Part 
Load interactions were also nonsignificant (all Fs  1). Because of the
slow nature of event-related changes in SCR levels, we could not assess the
effect of stake on SCR levels.
Figure 2. Regions (dotted lines) defined for the analysis of the acquired
eye-tracking data made during the decision-making phase (0–3,500 ms).
The size of each region was 90  99 pixels. For display purposes, we have
only used black and white (see the Method section for a detailed descrip-
tion of the stimuli and their colors).
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trast, subjects in the double-response group selected higher bets
with a lower probability of winning in the load blocks (3.18) than
in no-load blocks (3.08). The Group  Load interaction was
reliable (p  .037, B  5.57). This is consistent with the findings
of Verbruggen et al. (2012) and demonstrates that the two load
situations have a differential effect on choice: a stop load tends to
decrease betting, whereas a double-response load tends to increase
betting. Unlike in Verbruggen et al. (2012), the simple main effects
of load failed to reach significance in both groups (stop: p  .22,
B  0.93; double-response: p  .08, B  0.08).4 Betting scores
tended to decrease over time, an effect that was more pronounced
in the stop group. These conclusions are supported by a main effect
of part (p  .001) and a Group  Part interaction (p  .001).
However, part did not significantly modulate the Group  Load
interaction (p  .14; see Table 3).
Eye movements. As discussed in the introduction of this
experiment, we hypothesized that if stop signals induced quanti-
tative or qualitative changes in processing the amounts, dwell time
in the load condition in the stop group should be higher per
region/amount or more distributed over the six regions/amounts.
The top panels in Figure 3 show the average dwell time for each
location (from left to right, irrespective of amount), and the bottom
panels show the average dwell time for each amount (from low to
high, irrespective of location) as a function of group and load.
The analyses by spatial location (irrespective of amount) re-
vealed an overall central-display bias: Subjects generally spent
more time looking at the central areas than the periphery (p 
.001; see Table 4). Further, subjects in both groups looked more at
each number/response location in the no-load blocks than in the
load blocks (p  .001). This likely reflects the differences in
attentional monitoring demands in load blocks, in which subjects
had to detect a signal that could appear close to the top line (see
Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). The effect of load was larger
for the central locations than for the noncentral locations (p 
.018), although this could be attributable to a floor effect. It is
important to note that Figure 3 shows that the dwell-time patterns
were very similar for the stop and double-response groups. This
conclusion is supported by the univariate analyses (see Table 4),
which showed that the two-way Group  Load interaction (p 
.17) and the three-way Group  Load  Location interaction (p 
.97) were not significant. Thus, the location dwell-time data are
inconsistent with the idea that stopping influenced gambling by
encouraging a more elaborate processing style: Load generally
decreased processing of amounts, and it did so independently of
the kind of load (stop vs. double-response). Accordingly, it seems
highly unlikely that the behavioral Load Type  Betting interac-
tion was a result of differences in visual scanning.
The next analyses (by amount irrespective of spatial location)
showed that subjects focused on each amount for approximately
equal intervals of time (see Figure 3; main effect of amount: p 
.084). This was true for both groups (p  .357) and both load
conditions (p  .432). The Group  Load interaction (p  .171)
and the three-way Group  Load  Amount interaction (p  .241)
were nonsignificant. Combined, the dwell-time analyses indicate
that the load manipulations did not induce an attentional bias
toward lower or higher amounts.
Consistent with the dwell-time analyses, we found that the
number of fixations was lower in load blocks (stop group M 
6.43, SD  2.10; double-response group M  6.30, SD  2.17)
than in no-load blocks (stop group M  6.92, SD  2.10; double-
response group M  6.34, SD  2.28), F(1, 60)  4.681, p  .034,

2
 .072). This difference tended to be more pronounced in the
stop group, but the interaction was not reliable, F(1, 60)  3.478,
p  .067. There was also no main effect of group, F(1, 60)  .452,
p  .504.
In summary, the eye-movement data are inconsistent with the
increased cognitive processing accounts delineated in our intro-
duction. The location and amount analyses indicated that load
generally decreased dwell time on the relevant number regions.
Furthermore, we did not detect any qualitative changes in scanning
pattern. Combined, these findings indicate that a stop load did not
induce a more elaborate or systematic processing style.
SRC analyses. SCR tended to be lower for the stop group
(load M  .257 S, SD  .16; no-load M  .261 S, SD  .15)
than for the double-response group (load M  .308 S, SD  .11;
no-load M  .300 S, SD  .12). There was, however, no
significant SCR difference between groups, F(1, 62)  .063, p 
.82, generalized 2  .001; no significant difference between
no-load and load blocks, F(1, 62)  1.831, p  .18, generalized

2
 .029; and no significant interaction between them, F(1, 62) 
.643, p  .42, generalized 2  .010. Thus, these findings are
inconsistent with the idea that stopping influenced gambling by
altering arousal levels.
Experiments 2a and 2b: Can Transfer Effects Be
Obtained Through Alternative Methods of Inducing
Motor Caution?
The motor cautiousness hypothesis states that strategic control
adjustments in the stop-signal task influence gambling, leading to
a preference for lower amounts with a higher probability of win-
ning. Motor caution can be manipulated in different ways. For
example, many studies have shown that subjects respond more
cautiously when they are instructed to respond as accurately as
possible. We have previously argued that strategic adjustments in
the stop-signal paradigm resemble such strategic speed–accuracy
4 We used Bayesian t tests to test whether load decreased gambling.
Because the direction of the effect in the double-response group is opposite
of that in the stop group, deducting no-load from load leads to a Bayesian
factor lower than 0.33. The low Bayesian factor in the double-response
group reflects the numerical increase in betting scores with load.
Table 1
Results of the Analysis of Variance of the Choice Latencies in
Experiments 1 and 4
Experiments and
factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Experiment 1
Group 1 62 9.375 .003 .116
Load 1 62 127.920 .000 .219
Group  Load 1 62 8.985 .004 .019
Experiment 4
Group 2 69 3.368 .040 .080
Load 1 69 87.273 .000 .125
Group  Load 2 69 0.932 .399 .003
Note. df  degrees of freedom; Gen.  generalized.
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tradeoffs observed in other decision-making tasks. This raises the
question whether effects of motor caution on gambling can be
obtained in tasks that do not involve outright stopping of motor
responses.
In Experiment 2a, we examined whether manipulating the
speed–accuracy tradeoff modulated gambling. Subjects continu-
ously alternated between the gambling task (without stop signals)
and an unrelated perceptual decision-making task (also without
stop signals). In the perceptual decision-making task, two gray
rectangles were presented on each trial, and subjects had to re-
spond to the location of the brighter rectangle. They could respond
on all trials, but in half of the blocks (speed blocks), they were
instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the gray squares,
and in the remaining blocks, they had to respond as accurately as
possible (accuracy blocks). Research on task switching has dem-
onstrated that combining two tasks can produce strong carryover
effects when people execute them on consecutive trials (Kiesel et
al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, Verbrug-
gen, 2010). Usually, there are two costs associated with switching.
First, performance is impaired when people switch from one task
to another compared with repeating the same task (the task “switch
cost”). Part of this cost can be attributed to inertia or interference
caused by previously relevant task parameters or settings (Kiesel et
al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al., 2010). Second,
performance on task-repeat trials is often worse in mixed blocks,
in which both tasks occur, than in single-task blocks. At least part
of this mixing cost is also attributable to competition between
different possible rules (Vandierendonck et al., 2010). On the basis
of the robust carryover effects observed in the task-switching
literature, we predicted lower betting scores in accuracy blocks
than in speed blocks: Control settings in the perceptual decision-
making task were expected to influence choice in the gambling
task, leading to more cautious betting (i.e., longer gambling laten-
cies and a preference for lower amounts with a higher probability
of winning) in accuracy blocks than in speed blocks.
To ensure that differences between the speed–accuracy manip-
ulation and the stop manipulations in our previous experiments are
not attributable to changes in the design, we also ran a task-
switching experiment with the stop-signal task. In half of the
blocks, subjects constantly alternated between the gambling task
(without stop signals) and a stop-signal task; in the other half of the
blocks, they alternated between the gambling task (without stop
Table 2
Overview of the Betting Scores (Means, With Standard Deviations in Parentheses) as a Function of Stake and Part for Experiments 1,
3, and 4
Experiments and
conditions
Stake
Low Medium High
Experiment 1
Stop load 3.44 (0.13) 3.05 (0.12) 2.89 (0.12)
Stop no-load 3.47 (0.13) 3.12 (0.12) 3.02 (0.13)
Double load 3.42 (0.14) 3.15 (0.15) 2.96 (0.17)
Double no-load 3.29 (0.12) 3.05 (0.13) 2.91 (0.15)
Experiment 3
Rise 2.82 (0.17) 2.63 (0.18) 2.57 (0.19)
No-rise 2.79 (0.19) 2.61 (0.19) 2.55 (0.21)
Experiment 4
Control load 3.81 (0.17) 3.37 (0.19) 3.00 (0.21)
Control no-load 3.91 (0.17) 4.47 (0.19) 3.00 (0.20)
Low-problem g. load 3.51 (0.26) 3.04 (0.25) 2.69 (0.28)
Low-problem g. no-load 3.63 (0.23) 3.26 (0.24) 2.95 (0.27)
High-problem g. load 4.21 (0.29) 4.17 (0.32) 3.88 (0.35)
High-problem g. no-load 4.22 (0.28) 4.04 (0.30) 3.99 (0.33)
Part
1 2 3 4
Experiment 1
Stop load 3.65 (0.12) 3.21 (0.13) 2.86 (0.13) 2.80 (0.15)
Stop no-load 3.57 (0.11) 3.22 (0.12) 3.07 (0.13) 2.97 (0.16)
Double load 3.28 (0.14) 3.08 (0.16) 3.26 (0.17) 3.08 (0.16)
Double no-load 3.23 (0.13) 2.92 (0.13) 3.02 (0.15) 3.15 (0.16)
Experiment 3
Rise 2.86 (0.21) 2.67 (0.19) 2.54 (0.20) 2.64 (0.22)
No-rise 2.96 (0.22) 2.74 (0.20) 2.46 (0.19) 2.46 (0.20)
Experiment 4
Control load 3.66 (0.14) 3.47 (0.14) 3.25 (0.14) 3.23 (0.14)
Control no-load 3.50 (0.14) 3.69 (0.14) 3.30 (0.13) 3.26 (0.13)
Low-problem g. load 3.64 (0.14) 2.48 (0.14) 2.80 (0.15) 2.44 (0.15)
Low-problem g. no-load 3.78 (0.14) 3.30 (0.15) 3.05 (0.17) 3.01 (0.15)
High-problem g. load 4.16 (0.18) 4.15 (0.19) 4.13 (0.19) 3.16 (0.20)
High-problem g. no-load 3.85 (0.17) 4.09 (0.19) 4.36 (0.18) 3.76 (0.19)
Note. g.  gambler.
8 STEVENS ET AL.
signals) and a choice RT task in which they could respond on all
trials (without signals). If the effects of stopping in the previous
experiments were a result of some inertia related to the stop rules
or stop-specific control settings, subjects should prefer lower bets
with higher probabilities of winning in stop-signal blocks than in
no-signal (go) blocks.
Method
Subjects. Sixty-four new volunteers (Experiment 2a: 32 sub-
jects, 18 female, mean age  20 years; Experiment 2b: 32 subjects,
22 female, mean age  21 years) from the University of Exeter
community participated for monetary compensation. In Experi-
ment 2b, four subjects were replaced because their probability of
responding on stop-signal trials was below .35, suggesting that the
staircase tracking procedure (described later) did not work well for
them. The exclusion criteria were decided in advance of data
collection.
Procedure. In both experiments, subjects alternated between
the gambling task and a secondary task. The gambling task was
identical to the no-load blocks of Experiment 1.
Experiment 2a. In the secondary task (the perceptual
decision-making task), two gray rectangles were presented, and
subjects had to respond to the location of the brighter rectangle on
all trials. The task always started with a task reminder (“Bright-
ness”) for 250 ms, followed by the presentation of the two gray
rectangles (width  height: 3.5  7 cm; distance between rectan-
gles  1.5 cm) in the center of the screen against a black back-
ground. One rectangle was darker than the other, and subjects
responded to the location of the brighter rectangle by pressing the
s (for left) or l (for right) key with the little finger of the left or right
hand, respectively.
There were two block types: In the accuracy blocks, subjects
were instructed to respond as accurately as possible to the gray
rectangles, whereas they had to respond as quickly as possible to
them in the speed blocks. We used staircase-tracking procedures in
both block types to manipulate response strategies. In the accuracy
blocks, the brightness level was continuously adjusted. After every
four correct trials, the brightness difference (RGB difference)
reduced by four RGB points (making the decision more difficult;
e.g., RGB: 117, 117, 117 vs. RGB: 137, 137, 137 would become
RGB: 119, 119, 119 vs. RGB: 135, 135, 135). The difference
increased again after each incorrect trial (making the decision
easier again). Feedback (presented for 1,000 ms) indicated to the
subject whether the response was correct (“Brightness response 
Correct”) or not (“Brightness response  Incorrect”). In the speed
blocks, response latencies had to be shorter than a deadline that
was continuously adjusted according to a four-down-one-up track-
ing procedure. The deadline decreased by 50 ms after four fast
trials (making the speed task more difficult) but increased by 50
ms after one slow trial (making the speed task easier again).
Feedback indicated whether the response was fast enough
(“Brightness response  Fast enough”) or too slow (“Brightness
response  Too slow”). The brightness difference (yoked to the
difference in the accuracy blocks) remained constant in the speed
blocks. The staircase procedures ensured that in both block types,
the probability of positive feedback was approximately 84.1%.
The experiment started with two short blocks of 12 trials in
which subjects could practice the perceptual decision-making task
alone; the first block was always an accuracy block, followed by
a speed block. This was followed by a short block of five trials in
which subjects could practice the gambling task on its own. The
main experiment consisted of 12 task-switching blocks of 24 trials
in which the two tasks constantly alternated (i.e., there were no
task repetitions). Half of the subjects started with a speed block, in
which they switched predictably between the gambling task and
the speed condition of the perceptual decision-making task. The
other half started with an accuracy block, in which they switched
predictably between the gambling task and the accuracy condition
of the perceptual decision-making task. There was a short break
after each block; block types were ordered in strict alternation. In
the gambling task, subjects could (and were encouraged to) always
respond. Subjects were informed at the beginning of each block
whether they had to respond as quickly or accurately as possible in
the perceptual decision-making task.
Experiment 2b. There were two conditions: no-signal (go)
blocks and stop-signal blocks. In the no-signal blocks, no stop
signals could occur in the secondary task. On each trial, two gray
rectangles were presented in the secondary task. One rectangle was
darker (RGB: 117, 117, 117) than the other (RGB: 137, 137, 137),
Table 3
Results of the Analyses of Variance
Experiments and factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Experiment 1
Stake (low, medium, high) 2 124 22.352 .000 .031
Load (no-signal vs. signal) 1 62 0.035 .851 .000
Group  Stake 2 124 0.330 .719 .000
Group  Load 1 62 4.245 .044 .001
Stake  Load 2 124 1.373 .258 .000
Group  Stake  Load 2 124 0.012 .988 .000
Part (1–4) 3 186 11.518 .000 .022
Group  Part 3 186 6.396 .000 .012
Part  Load 3 186 1.464 .223 .001
Group  Part  Load 3 186 1.853 .139 .001
Experiment 3
Stake (low, medium, high) 2 62 3.962 .024 .010
Load (rise vs. no-rise) 1 31 0.137 .713 .000
Stake  Load 2 62 0.003 .996 .000
Part 3 93 3.715 .014 .019
Part  Load 3 93 1.433 .238 .002
Experiment 4
Group (control, low-problem,
high-problem) 2 69 3.688 .030 .088
Stake (low, medium, high) 2 138 45.020 .000 .042
Load (no-signal vs. signal) 1 69 4.037 .048 .001
Group  Stake 4 138 3.683 .007 .007
Group  Load 2 69 1.798 .173 .001
Stake  Load 2 138 0.849 .430 .000
Group  Stake  Load 4 138 2.785 .029 .001
Part 3 207 4.834 .003 .011
Group  Part 6 207 3.056 .007 .014
Part  Load 3 207 2.933 .035 .002
Group  Part  Load 6 207 1.027 .409 .001
Note. We analyzed betting scores using load, stake and part as within-
subject variables and group as a between-subject variable. We ran separate
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the Group  Load  Stake interaction
and the Group  Load  Part interaction because there were insufficient
trials for a full factorial analysis. To avoid redundancy, we only report
effects of part for the second ANOVA. df  degrees of freedom; Gen. 
generalized.
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and subjects responded to the location of the brighter rectangle by
pressing the s (for left) or l (for right) key with the little finger of
the left or right hand, respectively. The rectangles remained on the
screen for 2,000 ms, regardless of RT. At the end of each trial,
feedback was presented: “No Brightness response” when subjects
failed to respond in time on no-signal trials, “Brightness re-
sponse  Incorrect” when the response was incorrect, and “Bright-
ness response  Correct” when the response was correct. Subjects
could not win or lose points in the perceptual decision-making
task. The feedback remained on the screen for 1,000 ms, after
which it was removed. The next trial, which was always a gam-
bling trial, started after 250 ms.
In stop-signal blocks, on one-third of the trials the gray squares
turned blue (RGB: 0, 0, 255) after a variable delay, instructing the
subjects to refrain from responding. The stop-signal delay was
continuously adjusted according to a tracking procedure so that
subjects would be able to stop on approximately 50% of trials
(Logan et al., 1997; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). When subjects
made a response (signal-respond trial), the delay decreased by 50
ms on the following trial; when subjects successfully stopped
(signal-inhibit trial), the delay increased by 50 ms on the following
trial. Feedback was presented on no-signal trials (described ear-
lier), signal-respond trials (“Try to stop your Brightness re-
sponse”), and signal-inhibit trials (“Correct stop of Brightness
response”).
The experimental procedure was identical to the procedure of
Experiment 2a except that no-signal blocks replaced speed
blocks and stop-signal blocks replaced accuracy blocks. Stop
signals only occurred in the stop-signal task. In the gambling
task, subjects could (and were encouraged to) always respond.
Subjects were informed at the beginning of each block whether-
stop signals could occur in the perceptual decision-making
task.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. In the perceptual decision-making task
of Experiment 2a, subjects responded more quickly and made
more errors in the speed blocks (mean RT  493 ms, mean
accuracy  .76) than in the accuracy blocks (mean RT  691 ms,
mean accuracy  .87). These differences were reliable; RT:
t(31)  8.76, p  .001, Cohen’s dz  1.54; accuracy: t(31)  6.46,
p  .001, Cohen’s dz  1.16. In the speed condition, 84% of
responses were faster than the deadline, which demonstrates that
the tracking was successful. Combined, these data show that
Figure 3. Dwell-time data from Experiment 1. The top panels show the mean dwell times during the
decision-making phase for the six regions containing amounts arranged from left to right independently of the
magnitude of the bet (1 being the leftmost region). In both groups, there was more dwell time for these regions
in no-load blocks than in load blocks. There was also more dwell time for the more centrally presented bets. The
bottom panels show the mean dwell times during the decision-making phase by amount irrespective of spatial
location (1 being the lowest bet). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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subjects altered their speed–accuracy tradeoff, responding more
cautiously in accuracy blocks than in speed blocks.
In Experiment 2b, subjects responded more slowly but more
accurately to the gray squares in stop-signal blocks (mean RT 
688 ms, mean accuracy  97.5%) than in no-signal blocks (mean
RT  565 ms, mean accuracy  96.7%), which is consistent with
our previous findings (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). The RT
difference was reliable, t(31)  5.96, p  .007, Cohen’s dz  1.05,
whereas the accuracy difference was not significant, t(31)  1.28,
p  .211, Cohen’s dz  0.23. Note that RT and accuracy differ-
ences between blocks were considerably smaller than the differ-
ences observed in Experiment 2a. On signal trials, the average
probability of responding was .47, and the mean stop-signal delay
was 413 ms.
Betting data. Overviews of the descriptive statistics and of
the results of the mixed ANOVA are displayed in Tables 5 and 6
and Figure 4. In Experiment 2a, betting scores were very similar
in accuracy blocks (betting score  2.66) and speed blocks
(betting score  2.65; p  .81). Further Bayesian analyses
showed that the data provide substantial support for the null
hypothesis of no difference between accuracy and speed blocks
(B  0.14). There was a small but reliable difference in choice
latencies: Latencies in the bar task were 7 ms longer in accuracy
blocks (22 ms) than in speed blocks (29 ms), t(31)  2.061,
p  .048, Cohen’s dz  .36. These results show that a block-
based shift in speed–accuracy tradeoff does not influence gam-
bling preferences.
In Experiment 2b, subjects preferred lower bets in stop-signal
blocks (betting score  2.82) than in no-signal blocks in which
they could always respond (betting score  2.9). This effect
was significant (p  .050, B  3.99). An analysis of choice
latencies in the gambling task also showed a small but reliable
carryover effect: Choice latencies were 9 ms longer in stop-
signal blocks (29 ms) than in no-signal blocks (20 ms), t(31) 
2.85, p  .01, Cohen’s dz  0.50. These results show that
switching between a neutral stop-signal task and a gambling
task produces a transfer effect similar to introducing stop sig-
nals in the actual gambling game. This finding suggests that
stopping can influence performance in other tasks, even when
the tasks are separated in time. It is important to note that the
absence of a difference between speed (viz., no-signal) and
accuracy (viz., stop-signal) blocks in Experiment 2a indicates
that outright stopping, over and above caution per se, is re-
quired to observe a transfer effect.
Experiment 3: Is Response Inhibition Really Necessary
for Inducing the Transfer Effect?
Experiments 2a and 2b indicate that a stop manipulation but not
a speed–accuracy manipulation decreased betting. Experiment 3
further tested the specificity of the stop-signal manipulation. We
examined whether the inclusion of trials on which subjects could
not gamble was sufficient to produce an overall decrease in gam-
bling. In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, gambling-related
pop-up messages on electronic gambling machines break play and
inform gamblers when they have been playing continuously for a
set period of time.5 Such messages may reduce gambling by
encouraging players to actively decide to continue or discontinue
their gambling session (Monaghan, 2008, 2009). Even when the
message is noninformative, certain aspects of betting are influ-
enced by the insertion of a break (Rockloff, Donaldson, & Browne,
2014). It is possible that introducing stop trials in a gambling task
is similar to introducing a break, allowing subjects to actively
decide to continue selecting higher bets with a lower probability or
selecting lower amounts with a higher probability of winning
instead.
To test the idea that inserting stop-signal trials acted as a break,
we included blocks in which the bars did not rise on a third of the
trials. On no-rise trials, subjects had to wait for the next trial (i.e.,
they could not place a bet). If the stop effect is a result of the
inclusion of trials on which subjects could not place their bet, we
should also see lower betting in no-rise blocks than in blocks in
which the bars did rise on all trials.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-two new subjects (22 female, mean age  20
years) from the University of Exeter community participated for
monetary compensation (£6 [approximately U.S.$9]), which was
unrelated to performance.
Procedure. We used the bar task as described in Experiment
1. The only difference was that the load blocks were replaced by
no-rise blocks. On one-third of the trials in the no-rise blocks, the
bars would not start rising after 3,500 ms. The trial was automat-
ically aborted when a normal trial would have ended. Subjects
were instructed that they could and should only respond when the
bars did rise and hit the top line. In this experiment, we compared
betting scores of rise trials for standard blocks to the scores in
no-rise blocks (analogous to no-signal trials in Experiment 1).
Results and Discussion
An overview of descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2
and Figure 4. An overview of the ANOVAs is provided in Table
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possible link
between our manipulation and pop-up messages.
Table 4
Analyses of Variance for the Eye-Tracking Data in Experiment 1
Analyses and factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Region analysis
Load 1 60 16.362 .000 .214
Group 1 60 0.599 .442 .010
Region 5 300 74.141 .000 .869
Load  Group 1 60 1.917 .171 .031
Load  Region 5 300 3.015 .018 .212
Region  Group 5 300 0.480 .790 .041
Load  Group  Region 5 300 0.189 .966 .017
Amount analysis
Load 1 60 16.362 .000 .214
Group 1 60 0.599 .442 .010
Amount 5 300 3.086 .084 .409
Load  Group 1 60 1.917 .171 .031
Load  Amount 5 300 0.625 .432 .122
Amount  Group 5 300 0.863 .357 .150
Load  Group  Amount 5 300 1.403 .241 .214
Note. df  degrees of freedom; Gen.  generalized.
11STOP GAMBLING
3. The betting scores were similar in standard blocks (betting
score  2.67), in which the bars did rise on all trials, and no-rise
blocks (betting score  2.65), in which the bars did not rise on a
minority of the trials. A Bayesian analysis demonstrated that these
data provided substantial support for the null hypothesis of no
difference between the two block types (B  0.30). These results
show that when subjects do not gamble on a third of the trials, their
choice behavior remains comparable to blocks in which they
gamble on every trial. This suggests that the stop effect observed
in Verbruggen et al. (2012) and in Experiment 1 is not driven by
the insertion of trials on which subjects could not gamble. Instead,
it highlights again that actively stopping motor responses is re-
quired to observe a transfer effect.
Experiment 4: Does the Effect of Stopping on Decision
Making Generalize to Different Populations?
In Verbruggen et al. (2012) and Experiments 1–3 of the present
study, we used our bar task to examine the effects of a stop load
on gambling in a university population. Before we can draw any
theoretical conclusions, we believe it is important to demonstrate
that the load effect is not population or task specific. In Experiment
4, we test whether we find the same load effect in gamblers using
the bar task; in Experiment 5, we use a different gambling task to
test whether the load effect can be found in other gambling tasks.
One of the implications of our results is that our stop-gambling
task could be used to improve our understanding of gambling and
possibly lead to a means of reducing problem gambling behavior.
However, the university population tested so far is presumably risk
averse and low in gambling experience (like most people in the
population; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). To examine whether the
effect of stop signals is present in people who gamble more
frequently, we ran an experiment in which we tested low-problem
gamblers, high-problem gamblers, and matched controls using the
same bar task as in Experiment 1.
Method
Subjects. This study was conducted at Psychological Medi-
cine Laboratory, CHU-Brugmann, Université Libre de Bruxelles
(Brussels, Belgium). Forty-eight gamblers and 24 nongamblers
participated in the study (see Table 7 for characteristics). Subjects
from the nongambling control group were recruited by word of
mouth from the community (e.g., hospital employees). To avoid
biases resulting from inside knowledge of how these tasks operate,
psychiatrists, psychologists, and other personnel with psycholog-
ical training were excluded from participation. Gamblers were
recruited through advertisements from the casino complex VIAGE
in Brussels. The ads asked for subjects who “gambled frequently”
to participate in a 1-day study to explore factors associated with
gambling. A telephone screening interview was conducted by
means of a locally developed screening tool (see also, e.g., Bre-
vers, Cleeremans, Goudriaan, et al., 2012; Brevers, Cleeremans,
Verbruggen, et al., 2012), which included an examination of
frequency of gambling behavior and comorbid psychiatric disor-
ders. We excluded any subject from the gambling groups who (a)
reported gambling in casino settings less than once a week or less
than four times a month during the past 18 months, (b) was older
Table 5
Overview of the Betting Scores (Means, With Standard Deviations in Parentheses) for Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiments
and conditions
Stake Part
Low Medium High 1 2 3
Experiment 2a
Accuracy 2.87 (0.21) 2.59 (0.19) 2.53 (0.18) 2.87 (0.21) 2.59 (0.19) 2.53 (0.18)
Speed 2.89 (0.20) 2.59 (0.20) 2.47 (0.18) 2.89 (0.20) 2.59 (0.20) 2.47 (0.18)
Experiment 2b
Signal 3.04 (0.13) 2.76 (0.16) 2.65 (0.14) 3.00 (0.15) 2.82 (0.15) 2.64 (0.17)
No-signal 3.22 (0.14) 2.81 (0.13) 2.69 (0.13) 3.09 (0.15) 2.85 (0.14) 2.77 (0.17)
Table 6
Results of the Analyses of Variance for Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiments and factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Experiment 2a
Stake (low, medium, high) 2 62 10.396 .000 .022
Load (accuracy vs. speed) 1 31 0.057 .812 .000
Stake  Load 2 62 0.419 .659 .000
Part 2 62 0.577 .564 .001
Part  Load 2 62 0.559 .574 .000
Experiment 2b
Stake (low, medium, high) 2 62 25.749 .000 .059
Load (signal vs. no-signal) 1 31 4.159 .050 .003
Stake  Load 2 62 2.416 .097 .002
Part 2 62 4.125 .021 .026
Part  Load 2 62 0.296 .746 .000
Note. df  degrees of freedom; Gen.  generalized.
Figure 4. Differences between within-subject conditions (load vs. no-
load, speed vs. accuracy [acc], rise vs. no-rise) in four experiments and in
the combined analyses (CA). Exp.  experiment.
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than 65 years (to avoid potential confounds from slow motor
functioning due to aging), or (c) had experienced a substance
abuse–related disorder during the year before enrollment in the
study. In addition, those subjects included were judged to be
healthy on the basis of their medical history. Substance use and
medical history were examined using items taken from the Addic-
tion Severity Index Short Form (Hendriks, Kaplan, van Limbeek,
& Geerlings, 1989). We selected 24 frequent gamblers without a
gambling problem and 24 gamblers with a gambling problem. Gam-
bling dependence severity was assessed using the South Oaks Gam-
bling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987). On the basis of
Lesieur and Blume, a score of 5 or more on the SOGS was chosen as
an indication of high-problem gambling. In other words, subjects in
the high-problem gambling group scored 5 or more on the SOGS,
whereas subjects in the low-problem gambling group scored 4 or less.
Subjects in the matched control group reported that they did not
gamble. The ethical review board of the Brugmann Hospital (Brus-
sels) approved the study, and written informed consent was obtained
from all subjects.
Six control subjects were replaced for various reasons (two were
replaced because the percentage of anticipatory responses was
higher than 15%; one was replaced because stop-signal delay was
remarkably low—approximately 750 ms lower than the group
average; and three were replaced because of technical issues). One
high-problem gambler was replaced because the percentage of
missed responses was higher than 15%. Inclusion of these subjects
does not alter the results in a meaningful way.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the stop group
in Experiment 1. We did not include a double-response group
because of the potential vulnerability of this population to an
increase in gambling behavior.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks. As in Experiment 1, RTs were calcu-
lated relative to the moment the bars reached the top line; conse-
quently, negative values indicate that subjects responded before
the bars reached the line. Choice latencies were significantly
longer in stop-load blocks (11 ms) than in no-load blocks (50
ms; p  .001). This confirms that our stopping load induced motor
cautiousness. The difference between load and no-load blocks
tended to increase over time (p  .001). Overall, high-problem
gamblers (9 ms) were slower than the control subjects (39 ms)
and low-problem gamblers (43 ms). On signal trials, the average
probability of responding was similar (control: 48%; low-problem
gamblers: 47%; high-problem gamblers: 48%), which demon-
strates that the tracking procedure was successful in all groups. We
did not calculate stopping latencies because the procedure did not
allow their reliable estimation.
Betting scores. An overview of the data and analyses is pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3. On average, subjects preferred lower bets
in load blocks in which signals could occur (load blocks; betting
score  3.52) than in no-load blocks (betting score  3.61; p 
.048, Cohen’s dz  0.23, B  3.76). However, the Block Type 
Part interaction suggests that this difference was present only in
the later parts of this experiment (p  .035). The Load  Group
interaction was not significant, but the three-way Group 
Stake  Load interaction was (p  .029). This could indicate that
the stop load did not influence gambling preferences in each group.
To further explore this three-way interaction, we calculated
Bayes factors for each stake and group. In the control group,
results were inconclusive for all three stakes (low stake: B  2.11;
medium stake: B  1.24; high stake: B  0.38). The combined
Bayes factor was 0.99 (we multiplied the Bayes factors for each
stake; note that we obtained a similar value when we collapsed
stake first and calculated a Bayes factor based on these average
scores). For the low-problem gamblers, results were inconclusive
when the stakes were low (B  1.68), but there was strong support
for the experimental hypothesis when stakes were medium (B 
13.84) or high (B  11.73). The combined Bayes factor in this case
was 273.3. Thus, we can conclude that betting scores were lower
in load blocks than in no-load blocks for low-problem gamblers,
except when stakes were low. Finally, for the high-problem gam-
blers, we found support for the null hypothesis when stakes were
medium (B  0.16), but the results were inconclusive for low (B 
0.37) and high stakes (B  2.01). The combined Bayes factor was
0.12, which suggests that stopping did not influence betting in this
group (again, this was confirmed by a Bayesian analysis using the
average betting scores). In summary, this experiment shows that
occasionally stopping a response influenced betting strategies in
low-problem gamblers but not in high-problem gamblers. The
outcome for the control subjects was inconclusive.
There were other differences between groups. Betting scores
were generally higher for high-problem gamblers (4.08) than for
control subjects (3.43) and low-problem gamblers (3.18). Further,
the stake effect, which refers to lower betting scores for higher
stakes, was less pronounced in high-problem gamblers; this
Stake  Group interaction was reliable (p  .007). This indicates
that high-problem gamblers did not adjust their gambling strate-
gies when the probability of losing larger amounts increased,
unlike the two other groups. Finally, there was a significant
Group  Part interaction. Betting scores decreased over time in the
control group and the low-problem gambling group but not in the
high-problem gambling group. The high-problem gamblers’ fail-
ure to adjust betting strategies when stakes increased and their
failure to adjust betting strategies over time may be indicative of
their gambling problems, thus reflecting less flexible decision-
making processes in pathological gamblers (Brevers et al., 2012;
Noël et al., 2013). It is important to note that the group differences
also confirm the construct validity of our gambling task.
Combined Analysis
In this experiment, the simple main effect of stopping was
significant, but follow-up analyses indicated that this effect was
only reliable in the low-problem gambling group. In addition, we
Table 7
Gambler Characteristics in Experiment 4
Group n
Average age
(years) Gender (f) SOGS
Control 24 28 7 0.04
Low problem 24 28 8 1.60
High problem 24 35 12 9.10
Note. f  female; SOGS  South Oaks Gambling Screen.
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have recently conducted an EEG study using the paradigm of
Experiment 1. The results of this experiment are presented as
supplementary material. There were 32 subjects per group (double-
response vs. stop signal). In this study, we could not replicate the
critical Group  Load interaction (no-load vs. load blocks), F(1,
62)  .43, p  .51. The main effects of group and load were also
not significant (p  .86). Therefore, we did not analyze the EEG
data.
The absence of an effect in the control group of this experiment
and the failure to replicate the effect in another experiment raise
the question of whether the effect of stopping on gambling is
reliable. To examine this, we collapsed the data of all relevant
experiments in two analyses (see Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 4) to
test the Load  Group interaction (Analysis 1) and further explore
the simple main effect of stopping (Analysis 2).
For the first analysis, we collapsed the data of (a) Experiment 1
of Verbruggen et al. (2012), (b) the replication study discussed in
Verbruggen et al. (2012), (c) Experiment 1 of the present study,
and (d) the EEG experiment. In these experiments, there were both
stop and double-response groups. This resulted in a sample size of
216 unique subjects (108 in each group). To examine the time
course, we compared the first half with the second half of the
experiment, because the number of blocks differed between ex-
periments.6 The betting scores were analyzed using a Group (stop
vs. double-response)  Load (no-load vs. load)  Stake (Low,
medium, or high)  Part (first half vs. second half) mixed
ANOVA. For an overview of the descriptive and inferential sta-
tistics, see Tables 8 and 9 and Figure 4. The combined analysis
shows that subjects in the double-response group tended to go for
higher amounts in load blocks (betting score  2.95) than in
no-load blocks (betting score  2.89), whereas subjects in the stop
group chose lower bets in load blocks (betting score  2.81) than
in no-load blocks (betting score 2.89). This critical interaction is
reliable (p  .01), but the effect size is small (see Table 9; Cohen’s
d based on a t test for the interaction  0.35). Note that the mean
betting scores of the two groups were the same in no-load blocks.
The simple main effect of load was significant in the stop group,
F(1, 107)  4.33, p  .0397, generalized 2  .001, but not in the
double-response group, F(1, 107)  2.72, p  .10, generalized

2
 .001.
In the second analysis, we further explored the simple main
effect of stopping on gambling. We collapsed the data of the stop
groups of (a) Experiment 1 of Verbruggen et al. (2012), (b) the
replication study discussed in Verbruggen et al. (2012, p. 814), (c)
Experiment 1 of the present study, (d) the EEG experiment, and
the data of (e) Experiment 2b and (f) Experiment 4 of the present
study. This resulted in a sample of 212 stop subjects. The betting
scores were analyzed using a Load (no-load vs. load)  Stake
(low, medium, or high)  Part (first half vs. second half) repeated
measures ANOVA. Overviews of the descriptive and inferential
statistics are contained in Table 8 and Figure 4. Overall, subjects
selected lower bets in blocks in which a stop signal could occur
(betting score  3.10) than in blocks in which they could always
respond (betting score  3.17; p  .008), but the effect size was
small (see Table 9; Cohen’s dz calculated on the basis of a paired
t test  0.21). This difference between block types tended to be
more pronounced in the second half of the experiment (differ-
ence  .12) than in the first half (difference  .04; p  .039). In
a follow-up analysis, we examined whether betting was influenced
by the signal properties of the previous choice trial (stop-signal vs.
no-signal; we excluded the data of Experiment 2b from this anal-
ysis because the signals were not present in the actual gambling
task in this experiment). People often slow down after a stop trial
(e.g., Bissett & Logan, 2011; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; Verbrug-
gen & Logan, 2008b). Such sequential effects suggest that re-
sponse strategies and control settings set at the beginning of a
block are further adjusted after a signal trial. However, sequential
effects of stopping did not significantly modulate choice behavior
in load blocks: Betting scores after a signal trial (3.0977) were very
similar to betting scores after a no-signal trial (3.0979), F(1,
179)  .01, p  .99, generalized 2  .0001.
Finally, we explored correlations between the size of the stop
effect (the score of load blocks minus the score of no-load blocks;
negative values indicate that people selected lower bets in load
blocks than in no-load blocks), baseline risk taking in no-load
blocks as indexed by betting score, and the degree of slowing in
the bar task (reduction in RT in stop blocks compared with go
blocks). Experiment 2b of this study was also excluded from this
analysis, resulting in a sample of 180 subjects. The size of the stop
effect did not correlate significantly with slowing (r  .05, p 
.49) or the betting score in no-load blocks (r  .01, p  .90).
However, there was a significant correlation between the betting
score in no-load blocks and the degree of slowing (r  .44, p 
6 In the replication study of Verbruggen et al. (2012), there were 10
blocks, so the first “half” consisted of six blocks and the second “half” of
four blocks.
Table 8
Betting Scores (Means, With Standard Deviations in Parentheses) for the Combined Analyses
Analyses and conditions
Stake Part
Low Medium High 1 2
Combined analysis 1
Stop load 3.15 (0.07) 2.77 (0.07) 2.51 (0.08) 2.97 (0.07) 2.65 (0.08)
Stop no-load 3.24 (0.07) 2.83 (0.07) 2.60 (0.07) 3.01 (0.07) 2.77 (0.07)
Double load 3.28 (0.08) 2.89 (0.08) 2.67 (0.08) 3.03 (0.08) 2.85 (0.09)
Double no-load 3.18 (0.08) 2.85 (0.07) 2.66 (0.08) 3.00 (0.07) 2.79 (0.08)
Combined analysis 2 (stop only)
Load 3.43 (0.08) 3.07 (0.09) 2.78 (0.09) 3.25 (0.08) 2.94 (0.09)
No-load 3.50 (0.08) 3.13 (0.08) 2.88 (0.09) 3.29 (0.08) 3.06 (0.09)
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.001; see Figure 5). This is consistent with our recent finding that
stop-signal latencies in a standard stop task correlate with risk
taking in no-load blocks of the bar task (Verbruggen et al., 2013),
and it provides further support for the idea that there is some
overlap between motor control and risk taking in our gambling
task.
Experiment 5: Does the Effect of Stopping on Decision
Making Generalize to Other Tasks?
In Experiment 4, we explored whether the stop-load effect in the
bar task generalized to different populations. The bar task mea-
sures decision making under uncertainty (i.e., the exact probabil-
ities of winning were unknown). In this final experiment, we
combined the stop-signal manipulation with a task that measures
decision making under risk (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). On each
trial, subjects chose between two options of equal expected value
framed in terms of “wins” or “losses.” In the win domain, subjects
could win points (e.g., 80% chance of winning £0.75 vs. 20%
chance of winning £3.00), whereas they could lose points in the
loss domain (e.g., 80% chance of losing $0.75 vs. 20% chance of
losing $3.00). People generally tend to take more risks when
decisions are framed in terms of losses (Kahneman, 2003). There-
fore, in this experiment, we could explore whether stopping influ-
ences decision making equally in the win and loss domains.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-six volunteers (29 female, mean age  19
years) from the University of Exeter community participated for
partial course credit or monetary compensation (£5 [approximately
U.S.$7.5]), which was unrelated to performance. For every 10
subjects, an extra £5 was given to the subject with the highest end
score. One subject was excluded because the number of missed
responses was too high (34%), and three other subjects were
excluded because p(respond | signal) was either higher than 75% or
lower than 25% (indicating that the tracking procedure did not
work properly). Thus, 32 subjects were included in the final
analysis.
Apparatus, stimuli, and behavioral procedure. Stimuli
were presented on a 17-in. liquid crystal display monitor against a
white background. The task was run using Psychtoolbox (Brain-
ard, 1997). Subjects were tested in large groups, so we included
Table 9
Results of the Analyses of Variance for the Combined Analyses
Analyses and factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Combined analysis 1
Group 1 214 0.266 .606 .001
Stake 2 428 154.892 .000 .047
Load 1 214 0.401 .527 .000
Part 1 214 33.014 .000 .011
Group  Stake 2 428 0.611 .543 .000
Group  Load 1 214 7.055 .008 .001
Stake  Load 2 428 1.424 .242 .000
Group  Part 1 214 1.047 .307 .000
Part  Load 1 214 0.373 .542 .000
Stake  Part 2 428 1.676 .188 .000
Group  Load  Stake 2 428 1.160 .314 .000
Group  Load  Part 1 214 2.671 .104 .000
Group  Stake  Part 2 428 0.439 .645 .000
Load  Stake  Part 2 428 0.300 .741 .000
Group  Load  Stake  Part 2 428 0.308 .735 .000
Combined analysis 2
Stake 2 358 121.872 .000 .041
Load 1 179 7.055 .008 .001
Part 1 179 26.624 .000 .011
Load  Stake 2 358 0.967 .381 .000
Load  Part 1 179 4.305 .039 .000
Stake  Part 2 358 1.731 .178 .000
Load  Stake  Part 2 358 0.167 .846 .000
Note. df  degrees of freedom; Gen.  generalized.
Figure 5. There was a negative correlation (r  .44) between choice
behavior in no-load blocks and the amount of slowing in stop-signal
blocks.
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extra training blocks with immediate feedback to ensure that all
subjects understood the tasks.
In the first training phase of the experiment, subjects undertook
the risk task. On each trial, a subject saw a pair of cards labeled
either “WIN” or “LOSE” (see Figure 6, top panels). Each card
mentioned an amount of money and a probability (in percentage).
On WIN trials, the cards represented the amount that the subject
could win and the probability of winning that amount. On LOSE
trials, the cards represented the amount the subject could lose and
the probability of losing that amount. On both WIN and LOSE
trials, the higher amounts of money were associated with lower
probabilities of winning or losing, respectively (we henceforth
refer to the these cards as the “risky options”). There were four
possible card combinations: 20% chance to win £3 versus 80%
chance to win £0.75, 40% chance to win £1.50 versus 60% chance
to win £1.00, 20% chance to lose £3 versus 80% chance to lose
£0.75, and 40% chance to lose £1.50 versus 60% chance to lose
£1.00 (the risky options are italicized here for expository pur-
poses). On each trial, the expected value of the two options was the
same. The cards were displayed for up to 2,500 ms, during which
the subjects could select one of the two cards by pressing the left
arrow button for the left card or the right arrow button for the right
card. After a choice had been made, the computer immediately
showed the subject the “other side” of the chosen card, on which
the result of the bet was displayed for 1,000 ms (see Figure 6,
bottom panels). The next trial started after 500 ms. This training
phase consisted of three blocks of 16 trials. Each card combination
occurred four times per block, and the order of presentation was
randomized.
In the second training phase, subjects performed a neutral stop-
signal task. In no-signal blocks, on each trial the computer dis-
played two cards next to each other (analogous to the risk task),
one with a  on it and another with a 	 on it. Subjects were
instructed to respond as quickly as possible to the location of the 	 card
by pressing the corresponding key. The cards remained on the
screen until a response was executed or 2,500 ms had elapsed. At
the end of each trial, feedback was presented for 1,000 ms: “Too
late!” when subjects failed to respond in time on no-signal trials,
“‘Wrong Key!” when the response was incorrect, and “Correct”
when the response was correct. The next trial started after 500 ms.
In signal blocks, stop signals (a short auditory tone) occurred on
25% of the trials, instructing the subjects to withhold their re-
sponse. The auditory signal was presented after a variable delay,
which was continuously adjusted in 50-ms steps according to a
tracking procedure to obtain a probability of stopping of .50 (see
Experiment 1). On signal trials, the stimulus remained on the
screen until a response was executed or until stop-signal delay 	
1,250 ms had elapsed. This second training phase consisted of
eight blocks (four no-signal [NS] blocks and four signal [S]
blocks) of 16 trials. The order of the blocks (NS-S-NS-S-NS-S-
NS-S or S-NS-S-NS-S-NS-S-NS) was counterbalanced, and sub-
jects were informed at the beginning of each block whether stop
signals could occur.
In the third phase (the test phase), subjects played the same risk
task as in Phase 1, but half of the blocks were signal blocks in
which auditory stop signals occurred on 25% of the trials (cf.
Phase 2). This test phase consisted of six blocks (three no-signal
blocks and three signal blocks) of 16 trials. Again, the order of the
blocks was counterbalanced, and subjects were informed at the
beginning of each block whether stop signals could occur.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. Analyses of the stop-signal training
phase (Phase 2) show that subjects responded more accurately (.01
difference; p  .01) but more slowly (121-ms difference) in signal
blocks than in no-signal blocks (p  .001). This indicates that
subjects responded more cautiously in signal blocks than in no-
signal blocks in the training phase.
Risk scores. To examine performance in the test phase (Phase
3), we calculated the proportion of trials on which subjects selected
the risky option (the option with the higher absolute amount but
lower probability of winning or losing; described earlier). In the
loss domain, subjects tended to prefer the risky option more in the
signal blocks (M  .52, SD  .23) than in no-signal blocks (M 
.51, SD  .24). In contrast, in the win domain, subjects preferred
the safe option more in signal blocks (M  .43, SD  .26) than in
no-signal blocks (M  .47, SD  .24). There was no reliable effect
of load (p  .280) or domain (p  .327). The interaction also
failed to reach significance (p  .11; see Table 10). Nevertheless,
we ran t tests and calculated Bayes factors to test whether there
were reliable simple main effects of signal-block type in each
domain. To calculate the Bayes factor, we used a prior distribution
of possible effect sizes with the mean of 0.03 and standard devi-
ation of 0.015 because the combined analysis suggested that stop-
ping could decrease risk taking by approximately 3%. The effect of
stop signals (the signal vs. no-signal block difference) in the win
domain was reliable, t(31)  2.09, p  .045, Cohen’s dz  .37,
B  5.95. In contrast, this difference in the loss domain was not
reliable and supported the null hypothesis, though not unequivo-
cally, t(31)  0.466, p  .645, Cohen’s dz  .08, B  0.37. Note
that Bayes factors below 1/3 provide substantial support for the
Table 10
Results of the Analysis of Variance for Experiment 5
Factors df1 df2 F p Gen. 2
Domain 1 31 0.992 .327 .019
Load 1 31 1.211 .280 .001
Domain  Load 1 31 2.655 .113 .004
Note. df  degrees of freedom; Gen.  generalized.
Figure 6. Examples of cards from the risk task.
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null hypothesis. Bayes factors between 1/3 and 1 provide anecdotal
evidence for the null hypothesis. In sum, the results of this exper-
iment tentatively suggest that the inclusion of stop signals in a risk
task leads to reduced risk taking but only in the win domain; in the
loss domain, the inclusion of the stop signals does not seem to
affect choice behavior much. We discuss the implications of these
findings in the General Discussion.
General Discussion
Recently, we reported that adding a cognitive load to a gambling
task influences monetary decision making (Verbruggen et al.,
2012). When we asked people to occasionally add a response in a
secondary task, they tended to prefer higher bets with a lower
probability of winning. This is consistent with previous studies
demonstrating that a cognitive load increases impulsivity or ran-
dom responding in delayed discounting tasks (Franco-Watkins,
Pashler, & Rickard, 2006; Franco-Watkins, Rickard, & Pashler,
2010; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). In contrast, when we
asked people to occasionally withhold a motor response in the
secondary task, they tended to prefer lower bets with a higher
probability of winning (Verbruggen et al., 2012). In this article, we
further explored the link between motor control and gambling.
Effects of Stopping Motor Responses on Gambling
The main aim of this study was to examine how stopping motor
responses could influence gambling-related decisions. Dealing
with stop signals is thought to require reactive and proactive
inhibitory control (Aron, 2011; Logan, 1994; Verbruggen & Lo-
gan, 2009). Subjects need to engage in reactive inhibitory pro-
cesses when a stop signal occurs. When subjects are informed that
they may have to stop in the near future, they are thought to engage
in proactive control. In Experiment 1, we examined whether pro-
active control adjustments influenced gambling by changing
information-sampling strategies. One possibility is that the pres-
ence of stop signals leads to more comprehensive processing of the
betting options (cf. Verbruggen & Logan, 2009). Further, recent
work in our lab has demonstrated that adding visual stop signals to
a task alters visuospatial attentional settings (Verbruggen, Stevens,
et al., 2014). Such changes could influence betting, as our task
required processing amounts presented at different locations on the
screen. We also tested a noncognitive account in this experiment.
Stop signals have been shown to alter arousal levels (Casada &
Roache, 2006; Jennings et al., 1992; Van Boxtel et al., 2001),
which could influence gambling (Rockloff et al., 2007; Rockloff &
Greer, 2010). The results of Experiment 1 were inconsistent with
the processing and arousal accounts. The patterns of eye fixations
and SCRs were similar in the stop and double-response groups,
which is contrary to what one would expect if stop signals induced
a more elaborate processing style.
Experiment 2a did not support a general motor caution account
either. We found that a speed–accuracy tradeoff in a secondary
choice-reaction task without stop signals did not modulate gam-
bling preferences (even though gambling latencies were influ-
enced). The absence of a transfer effect could not be attributed to
the use of a task-switching design, because switching between a
secondary stop-signal task and the gambling task (without stop
signals) did modulate gambling (Experiment 2b). In Experiment 3,
we showed that occasionally not being able to make a bet (instead
of encountering a stop signal) did not influence decision making
either. Previous work has demonstrated that inserting a break
between gambles can reduce betting by encouraging people to
actively consider whether to continue gambling or not. However,
introducing trials on which subjects could not gamble did not
change betting in the bar task. The results of Experiments 2 and 3
provide strong support for the idea that the presence of stop signals
is essential for the transfer.
In Experiment 4, we tested whether the effect was also found in
low-problem gamblers, high-problem gamblers (i.e., people for
whom gambling was a problematic habit), and matched controls.
The high-problem gamblers took more risks in the bar task than
control subjects (who did not gamble), which confirms the con-
struct validity of our paradigm. The low-problem gamblers showed
a reliable reduction in betting scores in blocks in which stop
signals could occur (load blocks) versus blocks in which they
could always respond (no-load blocks). This demonstrates that the
effect of stopping generalizes to the wider, nonstudent population.
However, the high-problem gamblers did not show a similar effect.
Of course, this could be a by-product of, or a causal factor in, their
gambling problem. In addition to the analyses of the three groups,
we ran two analyses combining all the behavioral bar-task data we
have collected in the past 3 years. These analyses established that
cognitive load influences gambling, although the effect size was
small. Further, we found a correlation between motor cautiousness
and gambling in no-signal blocks, which provides further support
for the link between gambling and motor control (see also Ver-
bruggen, Adams, et al., 2013).
Finally, Experiment 5 suggested that the carryover effect is not
unique to the bar task. We observed reduced risk taking when stop
signals could occur in the win domain but not in the loss domain.
However, this difference between domains should be interpreted
with some caution as the interaction failed to reach significance.
Further, Bayesian analyses provided strong support for the exper-
imental hypothesis in the win domain (B was larger than 3) but
weaker evidence for the null hypothesis in the loss domain (B was
slightly larger than 1/3). In the supplementary material, we report
the results of another experiment in which we introduced stop
signals in a slot-machine gambling task. The results of this exper-
iment were generally consistent with the results found in the bar
and risk tasks. Together, these two experiments indicate that the
stop-load effect can be observed in different gambling tasks, but
the effect size remains small.
A Search for Common Mechanisms
Our results indicate that stopping influences gambling, but we
have found little evidence for changes in decision-making strate-
gies. How does stopping influence choice? On the basis of our
recent review of the literature on learning and response inhibition
(Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014), we
propose that response inhibition reduces the hedonic and motiva-
tional value of stimuli. Work by Guitart-Masip, Talmi, and Dolan
(2010) suggests that there may be a hardwired link between reward
(or approach) and going and between punishment (or avoidance)
and stopping. A similar link was suggested by Spunt, Lieberman,
Cohen, and Eisenberger (2012), who showed that stopping causes
affective distress. Further, several studies have found that consis-
17STOP GAMBLING
tent pairing of stimuli to stopping in a go/no-go or stop-signal-
paradigm reduces subsequent consumption or approach behavior
toward them (Houben, 2011; Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, &
Jansen, 2012; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Jones & Field, 2013;
Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison, Adams, & Chambers, 2014;
Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013).
Jones et al. (2011) showed that these effects are not related to
changes in heart rate, blood pressure, or self-reported changes in
general mood. Instead, the reduction of consumption or approach
behavior may be attributable to devaluation of the stop or no-go
stimuli (Houben et al., 2012; Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, Nobre, &
Eimer, 2008; Veling, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008) and to
reductions in motivational value (Ferrey, Frischen, & Fenske,
2012). Response inhibition may affect the motivational value of
stimuli via the creation of links between the stimuli and the
appetitive/aversive centers postulated by Dickinson and Dearing
(1979). These two centers mutually inhibit each other, which could
account for a wide range of phenomena in the learning literature
(cf. Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). For example, Dickinson and
Lovibond (1982; as cited in Dickinson & Balleine, 2002) demon-
strated that a conditioned appetitive jaw movement could be sup-
pressed by an aversive defensive eyeblink in rabbits; this interfer-
ence was attributed to an inhibitory interaction between an
appetitive center and an aversive center. The link between stopping
and aversion could easily explain why the value of stimuli asso-
ciated with stopping, or consumption of the stop-related items,
decreases. Further, priming of the aversive or avoidance center
could also explain why being cautious in a stop-signal task with
neutral stimuli reduces subsequent alcohol consumption in a taste
test (Jones et al., 2011).
Having to stop responses regularly in the context of a gambling
task could generally reduce gambling via a similar mechanism: By
activating or priming the aversive center, approach behavior to-
ward the higher amounts is reduced, and subjects develop a pref-
erence for the safer options. The appetitive/aversive centers ac-
count can explain why stopping influences gambling in the bar
task (Experiments 1,7 2b, and 4), whereas the speed–accuracy
manipulation did not (Experiment 2a). The no-rise manipulation in
Experiment 3 (which was possibly the equivalent of a no-go
manipulation) did not produce an effect on gambling either, but
this could be due to no-rise trials being less aversive than stop-
signal trials, which required last-minute stopping of a prepared
response. The behavioral trends observed in Experiment 5 are also
consistent with the appetitive/aversive account: Stopping reduced
risk taking when subjects had to choose between two options
framed as wins (appetitive), but not when they were framed as
losses (aversive). In fact, there was a slight numerical increase in
risk taking in the loss domain. We propose that stopping primes or
activates the aversive center, which suppresses the appetitive cen-
ter. Thus, when choice options are framed as wins, the activation
of the aversive center will reduce approach toward the high (ap-
petitive) amounts; in contrast, in the loss domain, stopping-
induced priming of the aversive center could make losses even
more aversive, leading to increased risk taking to avoid them
(though the difference between load and no-load blocks was not
reliable in the loss domain). Finally, the appetitive/aversive centers
account may provide further insights into the data for high-
problem gamblers. The absence of a load effect for the low and
medium stakes in high-problem gamblers could reflect an imbal-
ance between the two centers. The results indicate that high-
problem gamblers approach the high amounts more often (as
indicated by the high betting scores). Further, previous research
indicates that at least some subpopulations of high-problem gam-
blers fail to properly activate the stopping network (e.g., Brevers et
al., 2012). The appetitive and aversive centers mutually inhibit
each other, so increased activation of the appetitive center and a
failure to properly activate the stopping network on stop trials
would lead to the absence of a stop-load effect.
The idea that aversive stimuli or events can reduce gambling
also receives support from other studies. For example, Guitart-
Masip, Talmi, and Dolan (2010) have demonstrated that cues
associated with negative events in a learning phase can reduce
subsequent gambling in a test phase. Similarly, Clark et al. (2012)
have shown that cues associated with the delivery of a shock (i.e.,
an aversive event) reduce risky decision making in a gambling
task. Future research is required to explore the “stopping is aver-
sive” conjecture and the extent to which this can account for the
transfer between the stop and gambling tasks. But at this point, it
seems to provide a parsimonious account for a wide range of
findings related to stopping and conditioned inhibition.
Limitations
Together, our studies show that stopping motor responses and
gambling interact. However, the observed effect size was small.
The small size of the effect complicates further investigation of the
underlying mechanisms and makes possible applications in the
clinical domain more questionable. Therefore, further investiga-
tions should aim to increase the effect size.
One potential reason for the small effect size is that subjects
played for points rather than a monetary reward (although in one
pilot study we found that large monetary rewards actually de-
creased overall gambling in students, as they all selected the safe
amounts that in their opinion were still substantial compared with
the average pay in a psychology experiment). In Experiment 5, the
binary nature of the dependent variable could have further reduced
statistical power. Second, the large individual differences in the
way subjects play gambling games could have influenced the
effect size. Different strategies may lead to a differential reward
history, which might in turn influence later gambles. Only when
gambling games are played for a sufficiently long time might the
reinforcement schedules become more similar. Third, the size of
the effect could be influenced by the populations we used in our
studies. Most people tend to be risk averse under uncertain con-
ditions. Except for Experiment 4, all of our experiments were run
with university students; if our population does not gamble often
and already takes very little risk, the effect of a manipulation that
aims to further reduce risk taking is already somewhat constrained.
Studies using stop-signal training to reduce food consumption
show that the effect of stop training particularly affects people with
less inhibitory control in comparison with people with higher
levels of inhibitory control (Houben, 2011; Veling et al., 2011).
Consistent with this finding, we found that the size of the effect
was numerically larger for the low-problem gamblers than for the
matched controls, though this group difference was not reliable.
7 The appetitive/aversive account does not directly predict differences in
processing styles or changes in arousal (see Experiment 1).
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High-problem gamblers, however, did not show a stop effect,
possibly for reasons discussed earlier.
Practical Implications
Despite the limitations, we believe that our findings and the
theoretical framework presented here can have some practical
implications. Our work indicates that stopping motor responses
can encourage people to select lower bets with a higher probability
of winning. We attribute this to a reduction in approach behavior
via the priming of an aversive or avoidance center. This could open
avenues for the development of a behavioral treatment program for
problem gambling. For example, interventions could consistently
pair gambling tasks or gambling-related stimuli with stopping.
Previous work has already shown that similar response-inhibition
training tasks can influence food and alcohol consumption. For
example, Veling, van Koningsbruggen, Aarts, and Stoebe (2014)
found that an online training program that involved practicing a
food-related response-inhibition task for 4 weeks was an effective
tool to induce weight loss. In other words, this finding demon-
strates that training response inhibition may have an impact on
behavior outside the lab.
Training response inhibition may in fact be useful for the
treatment of various clinical populations. Response inhibition def-
icits have been observed in impulsivity disorders, such as attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and in compulsivity disorders, such
as obsessive–compulsive disorder (Robbins et al., 2012). Inhibi-
tion deficits have also been observed in substance abuse, eating
disorders, and gambling disorders (note that impulsivity and com-
pulsivity may both be present in addictive disorders; Robbins et
al., 2012). The present study and work on “stop learning” indicates
that behavioral training tasks may be used to alleviate such
response-inhibition deficits. Of course, much more work is re-
quired to understand how inhibition training works, to determine
the longevity of the training effects, and to know for which
disorders or subpopulations inhibition training tasks can be useful.
For example, response-inhibition training may not be beneficial for
all pathological gamblers. Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) have
argued that there are several pathways to problem gambling. They
distinguished between three subgroups of pathological gamblers:
(a) behaviorally conditioned problem gamblers; (b) emotionally
vulnerable problem gamblers; and (c) antisocial, impulsive prob-
lem gamblers. They proposed that different treatments may be
required for the three subgroups. Indeed, stop-signal training may
be more effective for behaviorally conditioned or impulsive than
for emotionally vulnerable problem gamblers. More generally, this
highlights again the need for a detailed analysis of control deficits
in clinical populations (Holmes et al., 2014; Verbruggen,
McLaren, et al., 2014).
Of course, stop-signal training will not be a “silver bullet” for
the treatment of any impulsivity and compulsivity disorders. How-
ever, it may complement other existing treatments (see, e.g., Vel-
ing et al., 2014, who used a combined approach in their food-
training study), including those for problem gambling. For
example, therapies targeting erroneous cognitions, gambling urges,
and motivations appear efficacious in the treatment of problem
gambling (Potenza et al., 2013, p. 381). Stop-signal training alters
habitual responses or behaviors and can change the motivational
value of stimuli, tasks, or contexts. As such, it may become an
extra clinical tool for the treatment of problem gambling. It may
also complement regulatory measures. As noted earlier, in certain
countries, gambling-related pop-up messages on electronic gaming
machines interrupt play. The gambling-related pop-up messages
may help to remind people about their gambling-related goals
(e.g., “I should not spend more than an X amount of money”) and
encourage them to actively decide whether they would like to
continue gambling or not, whereas our stop-signal manipulation
seems to reduce betting and approach behavior via a link with an
aversive system. In other words, the pop-up messages and the
stop-signal training may provide two different routes to modulate
decision making when gambling and could, therefore, complement
each other well.
Conclusions
The results of several experiments support a link between motor
control and decision making. They indicate that the effect of
response inhibition on gambling is present in different populations
and tasks and that it is driven by the presence of stop signals
specifically. Despite the modest effect size, this link between
stopping and gambling provides a strong incentive to explore other
avenues in an attempt to increase our understanding of risky
decision making in humans. It also perhaps suggests interventions
to reduce harmful behavior.
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